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Abstract: The rise of for-profit EMOs often becomes evidence of substantial shifts in the 
governance of education, through which schooling may become privatized and 
commercialized. This study is designed to understand the economic behavior of for-profit 
educational management organization charter schools, by focusing on their site selection 
decisions as a critical factor in making a profit. Using the locations of for-profit EMO 
charter schools in Michigan, the study examines determinants of the location decision on 
charter school markets, with the choice set of potential school districts. This research finds 
changes of the odds ratio in the percentage of for-profit EMO charter schools, logged 
expenditures per pupil, and in the proportions of African-American populations, 
populations who have experienced higher education, and unemployed populations. 
Provided that for-profit EMO charter schools make a site selection decision according to 
areas with certain characteristics, the spatial disparity of access to charter schools can raise 
issues concerning unequal educational opportunities. 
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Entendiendo la selección de local de organizaciones charter de organización 
educativa con fines de lucro 
Resumen: La aparición de EMO con fines de lucro a menudo se convierte en evidencia 
de cambios sustanciales en la gobernanza de la educación, a través de los cuales la 
escolarización puede tornarse privatizada y comercializada. Este estudio fue elaborado para 
entender el comportamiento económico de las escuelas charter de organizaciones de 
gestión educativa con fines lucrativos, concentrándose en sus decisiones de selección de 
local como un factor crítico para obtener ganancias. Utilizando la ubicación de escuelas 
charter EMO con fines de lucro en Michigan, el estudio examina los determinantes de la 
decisión de localización en los mercados de escuelas chárter, con la elección de los 
distritos escolares potenciales. Esta investigación encuentra cambios en la razón de 
posibilidades en el porcentaje de escuelas charter EMO con fines lucrativos, gastos 
registrados por alumno, y en las proporciones de poblaciones afroamericanas, que tienen 
educación superior y poblaciones desempleadas. Dado que las escuelas charter EMO con 
fines de lucro toman una decisión de selección de local de acuerdo con áreas con ciertas 
características, la disparidad espacial de acceso a escuelas charter puede plantear cuestiones 
sobre oportunidades educativas desiguales. 
Palabras clave: con fines de lucro; organización de gestión educativa; escuela charter; 
localización 
 
Entendendo a seleção de local de organizações charter de organização educacional 
com fins lucrativos 
Resumo: O surgimento de EMOs com fins lucrativos muitas vezes se torna evidência de 
mudanças substanciais na governança da educação, através das quais a escolarização pode 
se tornar privatizada e comercializada. Este estudo foi elaborado para entender o 
comportamento econômico das escolas charter de organizações de gestão educacional com 
fins lucrativos, concentrando-se em suas decisões de seleção de local como um fator 
crítico para obter lucro. Usando a localização de escolas charter EMO com fins lucrativos 
em Michigan, o estudo examina os determinantes da decisão de localização em mercados 
de escolas charter, com a escolha de potenciais distritos escolares. Esta pesquisa encontra 
mudanças na razão de chances na porcentagem de escolas charter EMO com fins 
lucrativos, gastos registrados por aluno, e nas proporções de populações afro-americanas, 
que têm educação superior e populações desempregadas. Desde que as escolas charter 
EMO com fins lucrativos tomem uma decisão de seleção de local de acordo com áreas 
com certas características, a disparidade espacial de acesso a escolas charter pode levantar 
questões sobre oportunidades educacionais desiguais.  
Palavras-chave: com fins lucrativos; organização de gestão educacional; escola charter; 
localização 
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Introduction 
As recent school policies triggered by market metaphors put weight on competition among 
educational service providers, educational marketplaces are facing growing diversification in 
management with the involvement of non-traditional educational organizations, such as profit-
oriented entities and philanthropic agencies. Proponents of marketization in education have argued 
that such mixed-mode markets, where for-profit organizations coexist with non-profit ones 
(Marwell & McInerney, 2005), could be the best way to deliver schooling on the grounds that 
competition among service vendors brings about better services, lower prices and higher 
satisfaction. Echoing this promising potential, outsourcing the management and operation of public 
entities from private organizations is becoming increasingly common in the public school systems. 
We specifically call this “private organization or firm that manages public schools, including district 
and charter public schools” an educational management organization, or EMO (Miron & Gulosino, 
2013, p. 2). While the previous business model simply contracted with private organizations to sell 
school supplies or provide transportation services, the currently rising EMOs closely engage in in-
class instruction by providing ready-to-use academic activities and tools (Miron, 2008).  
In particular, the appearance of EMOs fuels the expansion of charter schools, which are 
publicly funded but privately managed (Bulkley, 2005; Engel, 2000). Many state charter school laws 
allow private companies and firms to take part in competitive education markets in the attempt to 
depart from a “one-size-fits-all” model (Miron, Evergreen, & Urschel, 2008; Scott & DiMartino, 
2010). EMOs with specialized knowledge and professional experience have supported the 
establishment and management of charter schools, which are provided with limited administrative 
and instructional support from school districts in exchange for relatively greater autonomy. The 
potential of monetary benefit from leasing contracts with charter school founders has attracted 
profit-oriented EMOs to enter into charter school markets, as well as charter school management 
organizations derived from the non-profit sector in the late 1990s.  
With the growth of charter schools administered by EMOs, differences among charter 
schools by management type have been well-documented (H. Brown, Henig, Lacireno-Paquet, & 
Holyoke, 2004; Fuller, Gawlik, Gonzales, Park, & Gibbings, 2003; Lacireno-Paquet, 2004; Morley, 
2006). Yet, the findings on school budgets, student enrollment patterns and test scores have resulted 
in controversial questions over success and failure of the autonomous public schools operated by 
for-profit EMOs. For example, the extant research points out disparities in charter school 
enrollment patterns according to management orientations, so heightens the concern that for-profit 
EMO-operated charter schools are more likely to serve a lower proportion of minority and 
disadvantaged students (Ertas & Roch, 2014; Henig, Holyoke, Brown, & Lacireno-Paquet, 2005; 
Lacireno-Paquet, Holyoke, Moser, & Henig, 2002; Miron, Urschel, Mathis, & Tornquist, 2010; U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2012; Zollers & Ramanathan, 1998). A number of studies 
indicate that students in profit-oriented EMO charter schools have mixed, or often worse, academic 
growth (Byrnes, 2009; Educational Policy Institute, 2005; Garcia, Molnar, & Barber, 2009; Gill, 
Zimmer, Christman, & Blanc, 2007; M. A. Mac Iver & Mac Iver, 2006; Miron, 2008; U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2003).  
The discouraging statements established in a wealth of literature on EMOs, however, do not 
provide fundamental information concerning charter schools under profit-oriented organizations. In 
contrast to non-profit EMOs built upon philanthropic objectives and altruistic orientations, EMOs 
driven by the principle of profit maximization reckon with instructional activities as a moneymaking 
commodity to be sold to families. This inherent preference toward monetary incentives groups 
customers into potentially profitable ones or not, and values marketplaces that are likely to be 
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financially rewarding in the future. When a certain fraction of EMOs align their educational activities 
more with maximum returns for investments rather than with benefits to children, their fiscal 
motives are deliberately integrated with a site selection decision for better access to desirable 
customers in convenient regions. Given that service vendor location serves as a gateway to service 
utilization, the involvement of for-profit EMO operated charter schools in traditional public school 
systems has the potential to create EMO charter school deserts or oases. Although the growing 
number of profit-driven EMO charter schools calls for empirical scrutiny of their locations behind 
market features and the resulting impacts on students, there is a dearth of knowledge on the decision 
about where profit-oriented EMOs open their business. Relatively little research has been devoted 
to shedding light on what market characteristics lead for-profit EMOs to engage in education 
markets ultimately serving the public good. Since the privatization in other public service sectors has 
consistently challenged issues such as social inclusion and civic engagement (Warner & Hefetz, 
2002), this study examines locational decision as a critical consideration in generating profit. This 
may offer a glimpse into the economic behavior of particular EMO charter schools, whose initial 
objectives are to maximize profit.  
Research Background 
In the US, the number of enrollments in charter schools operated by private management 
organizations, which are run for profit or operated on a non-profit basis, has reached about 44% 
(Miron & Gulosino, 2013). The number of for-profit EMOs also increased to 97 by operating 840 
charter schools and serving about 460,000 students in the 2011-12 school year, in comparison with 
the 2001-02 school year where 36 for-profit EMOs ran 368 charter schools (Miron & Gulosino, 
2013; Miron, Urschel, Yat Aguilar, & Dailey, 2012; Molnar, Wilson, Restori, & Hutchison, 2002). 
Though for-profit EMOs are steadily expanding their market share of charter schools, a growing 
body of research on profit-motivated EMOs has focused little on underlying questions of who they 
are, what stimulates their engagement in public education, and how they respond to quasi-market 
structures. This section reviews the manner in which business and industry utilize profitable 
opportunities in markets for public services, and outlines how their economic behaviors may be 
replicated and modified in the education sector. 
For-Profit Entity Behaviors in Not-For-Profit Markets 
Inspired by the ideological argument for efficiency and effectiveness of public services 
delivered by competitive markets, a number of local and state governments in the US have 
transferred activities and functions from public spheres to private organizations, only leaving 
authorities to governmental agencies (Starr, 2014; Wettenhall, 2003). This blurring distinction 
between public and private domains not only challenges the traditional approach to distinguishing 
public and private organizations by ownership, funding and control, but also demands empirical 
research on the potentials and pitfalls of competitive environments (Boyne, 2002; Bozeman, 1987; 
Rainey, 1979). Therefore, apart from the examination of productivity in public-private partnerships 
through contracting and outsourcing, the increasing involvement of non-governmental 
organizations in public service delivery invites investigation into how well their behaviors and the 
corresponding consequences demonstrate alignment with public values, such as accountability, 
equity and responsiveness (Besley & Ghatak, 2003; Le Grand, 2007; Warner & Hefetz, 2002). In the 
neoliberal era, searching for a synergy through competition and collaboration between governmental 
agencies and diverse providers, profit-seeking enterprises engaging in a complex joint market have 
been required to share responsibility for equal access to and utilization of services (Bozeman, 2007; 
T. L. Brown, Potoski, & Van Slyke, 2006; Warner & Hefetz, 2002). Proponents of market 
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mechanisms have claimed that the rise of privatization in public service fields would not necessarily 
result in the destruction of equity unlike a zero-sum game (Freeman, 2003; Reitz, 2008).  
Still, much work to date has suggested that private sectors threaten public interest values 
with regard to accessing and utilizing public services in quasi-markets (Andrews & Entwistle, 2010; 
Andrews & Van de Walle, 2013; Robinson, 2007; Warner & Hefetz, 2008). Many researchers have 
found that transfer of public money to private entities fails to keep the balance between private 
interests and democratic values, and causes unintended harm to vulnerable populations in the 
contexts of military and prison (Gran & Henry, 2007; Minow, 2005; Ravitch, 2013). Such criticisms, 
that processes and outcomes by private organizations in public domains undermine social justice, 
have more often targeted for-profit organization than not-for-profit entities. Non-profit 
organizations with diverse missions, including charitable objectives and religious motivations, 
potentially contribute to social inclusiveness and justice (DiMaggio & Anheier, 1990; Weisbrod, 
1988), and indeed several studies evince advantages and benefits of non-profit status organizations 
in public services (Amirkhanyan, Kim, & Lambright, 2008; Cleveland & Krashinsky, 2009; Ferris & 
Graddy, 1999). On the other hand, the distinct organizational orientation toward profit 
maximization often becomes incompatible with collective purposes required in publicly offered 
products and services. Private entities with the focus on economic incentives can maneuver 
strategies to reach out to favorable targets while lowering operating costs and enhancing customer 
satisfaction. (Besley & Ghatak, 2003; Boyne, Powell, & Ashworth, 2001; Garrity, Garrison, & 
Fiedler, 2010). However, such tailored strategies to offer service access to profitable customers do 
not justify the generic goal of obtaining financial gains dedicated by for-profit entrepreneurs. The 
rising delivery of public services by profit-seeking entities cannot be completely free from discourse 
of public interest related to equitable access for service utilization (Cameron, 2004; Haque, 2001; 
Heen, 2004; Sinclair, 2003; Tilak, 2008).  
Impact of Location on Access to Quasi-Markets 
As widely used management behaviors for profit maximization, price competition and 
location selection deserve more attention as illustrative evidence (Hotelling, 1929). However, the 
story becomes complicated in the case of profit-seeking organizations, specifically those that offer 
public services and are operated with public money. Because tax-based services and facilities are not 
initially aimed at yielding a surplus over operating expenses, most public domains regulate and fix 
prices in terms of equitable access to services through increasing affordability. For-profit entities 
serving public services are also restricted from attracting customers through differentiated price 
policies. Thus, as a location decision functions as a major proxy for obtaining financial advantages in 
competitive contexts, profit-seeking organizations may more aggressively value location in order to 
position themselves closer to desirable customers. 
The real problem, as a number of studies have indicated, is that location has historically 
delivered identifiable information with reference to race, ethnicity, income, education, wealth, and 
other factors (Bader & Krysan, 2015; Clark, 1992; Emerson, Chai, & Yancey, 2001; Highsmith & 
Erickson, 2015; Jargowsky, 2014; Krysan, Couper, Farley, & Forman, 2009). Profit-oriented service 
vendors, seeking to identify who are financially profitable customers, can make judgments about 
potential markets on the basis of the demographic and socioeconomic features in a specific place, 
regardless of service benefits and demands. Their behavior holds great potential for empowering a 
certain group of people to exercise choice in markets, or allowing limited access to given student 
populations with special needs in disadvantaged areas (Le Grand, 2007; Savas, 2005; Starr, 2014). In 
other words, the location decision designed for profit maximization in not-for-profit market leads to 
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an over- or under-supply of for-profit organizations in particular regions, which in turn would lead 
to uneven distributions of public services by provider types.  
With regard to the concern about businesses’ reactions caused by locational advantages and 
disadvantages, market theorists have maintained that spatial patterns of for-profit entities in public 
service sectors do not matter. In the past, full access to specific service options has been bounded 
within pre-designed zones invoking the classic argument of voting-with-one's-feet, whereas current 
open marketplaces could allow customers with free will to choose any service option across areas 
without geographic restrictions or interferences (Chubb & Moe, 1990; Tiebout, 1956). Nevertheless, 
previous research consistently demonstrates that choice can only work properly under the 
circumstance where users have access to markets within their adjacent neighborhoods (Briffault, 
1996; Le Grand, 2007; Levett, 2003; Nechyba, 2010). Particularly taking into account most 
beneficiaries who are less likely to travel farther away to shop for public healthcare and education 
(Field & Briggs, 2001; Hastings, Kane, & Staiger, 2005; Neutens, 2015; Roghmann & Zastowny, 
1979), a geographical imbalance between supply and demand may give rise to the lack of 
competition and the declining quality of services in public service markets (Brekke, Siciliani, & 
Straume, 2011; Kain, 1992; Van Slyke, 2003). The manner in which corporations respond to market 
forces through site selections may undermine the foundation of public services pursuing public 
purposes.  
Site Selection of For-Profit EMO Charter Schools 
As service users in education markets, parents are more likely to enroll their children in 
geographically accessible schools and be satisfied with having one or more schools within not-too-
distant areas (Burgess, Greaves, Vignoles, & Wilson, 2015; Glazerman, 1998; Goldring & Hausman, 
1999; Hanushek, Kain, & Rivkin, 2004; Hastings et al., 2005; Le Grand, 2007; Marshall et al., 2010; 
Rhodes & DeLuca, 2014; Theobald, 2005). Despite having with no exclusionary zoning policies, 
proximity has been a factor in utilization of school options in educational markets (Keddie, 2016; 
Lubienski, Lee, & Gordon, 2013). Furthermore, some level of stability in charter school markets, 
derived from little student mobility and government restrictions on school establishment and 
licensing, can reinforce the importance of locational incentives in charter school positioning (Betts, 
2005; Gulosino & Miron, 2017; Hastings et al., 2005; Renzulli & Evans, 2005). With this in mind, it 
is not surprising even if for-profit EMO-operated charter schools become highly dependent upon 
the analysis of a place in which the organizations are able to yield financial gains in territories 
subdivided by race, ethnicity, poverty, education, employment and occupation (Conn, 2002; 
Jargowsky, 1997; Lichter, Parisi, & Taquino, 2012; Massey & Denton, 1993; W. J. Wilson, 2012). For 
example, charter schools initiated by for-profit firms in Washington, DC, were located in census 
tracts with fewer populations of Hispanic origin, more households with homeownership, and more 
vacant school buildings (Henig & MacDonald, 2002). A number of for-profit EMO charter schools 
in the US were more likely to be situated in economically advantaged regions with more 
homeowners and fewer Title-I eligible families (Robertson, 2015). A large proportion of some 
charter schools operated by EMOs running for profit employed certain recruiting strategies 
associated with spatial attributes, by opening their business in areas with more non-disability 
students and socioeconomically advantaged families (Estes, 2004; Gulosino & Lubienski, 2011; U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2012; Zollers & Ramanathan, 1998).  
Of course, market strategies used by profit seeking EMOs are not solely responsible for 
charter school locations. State laws and local policies to promote the establishment of charter 
schools in an attempt to serve more at-risk children stall the market entry decision of for-profit 
EMOs. The capacity and inclination of communities can limit the discretion of profit-oriented EMO 
Understanding site selection of for -profit EMO charter schools 7 
 
charter schools on site selection. Nonetheless, extant evidence on spatial preferences of charter 
schools consistently raises concerns that EMOs seek to yield a high return on investment through 
neighboring students in need of less costly and time-consuming services (Gulosino & d'Entremont, 
2011; Gulosino & Lubienski, 2011; Lubienski, Gulosino, & Weitzel, 2009; Robertson, 2015). In spite 
of its considerable contribution, the current studies provide insufficient insights into distinct market 
behaviors presented by EMO charter schools. The findings, mainly drawn from enrollment data of 
student and family characteristics and locational information derived from resident attributes, take 
no account of potential markets for prospective demands and the size of competitors. A few studies 
have illuminated the profit-making schemes of educational organizations, by investigating how 
educational service providers were sensitively responsive to the dynamic of schooling markets 
(Gulosino & Miron, 2017; Weber & Baker, in press). They generally indicated that the inclination to 
strengthen revenue sources over expenditures constructed the geographical cluster of charter 
schools operated by profit-making management organizations by suggesting the high dependence 
upon financial resources. Though there remains the fundamental difference that their studies relied 
on private schools as non-profit organizations, Downes and Greenstein (1996, 2002) studied the 
locational decision of existing and newly opened private schools. Their studies found that private 
schools assigned different value to student demographics and the characteristics of school districts 
and neighboring areas in competitive environments. In enhancing research on the role and limitation 
of for-profit entities in not-for-profit markets, their research results offer a noteworthy and 
comprehensive approach to seeking monetary incentives in educational markets in terms of the 
foundation of public schooling. 
Data and Methods 
This study is not intended to describe simple locational characteristics of for-profit EMO 
charter schools by comparing with other market competitors such as non-profit EMO charter 
schools and private schools. Rather, this study shifts interest toward economic behaviors in order to 
better understand differentiated engagement in profit-seeking. By focusing on the state of Michigan 
with the largest for-profit EMO charter school markets, this allows us to explain how for-profit 
EMO charter schools differently respond to market attributes. 
Charter School Contexts in Michigan 
Legally known in the state as “public school academies,” a charter school in Michigan is “a 
state-supported public school under the state constitution, operating under a charter contract issued 
by a public authorizing body” (Michigan Department of Education, 2012). Like other states 
establishing charter school laws, Michigan charter schools that do not charge tuition shall not 
discriminate applicants on the basis of their race, ethnicity, intellectual or athletic ability, and 
disability status in admission processes. Excluding very few exceptions, enrollment in the charter 
schools is open to all children who reside in Michigan, and is not limited by the political boundaries 
such as attendance zones and school district borders. The Michigan Revised School Code allows 
multiple authorizers, such as the governing board of colleges and universities and intermediate 
(essentially county-level) school districts, to issue a charter school contract and oversee the school. 
Michigan charter schools can make the management agreements on administrative and instructional 
services with for-profit business corporations. The first charter school in Michigan opened in 1994, 
and by the 2010-11 school year Michigan was operating about 270 charter schools, serving 7% of all 
Michigan students. The Detroit metropolitan area has the highest charter school market share 
among school districts serving more than 10,000 students in the United States following New 
Orleans and District of Columbia (National Alliance for Public Charter Schools, 2012). In Michigan, 
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with this highly competitive charter school market, over 70% of total charter schools are operated 
by either non-profit or for-profit EMOs. This market proportion initiated by EMOs is over two 
times higher than the national average of less than 30% of charter schools being run by education 
management organizations.  
Market Density in Site Selection 
Site selection is the business strategy broadly adopted by for-profit firms before they take on 
specific actions to survive in competitive markets and maximize financial gains (Bartik, 1985; Caves 
& Porter, 1977; Fuentelsaz & Gómez, 2006; Marwell & McInerney, 2005; Zhang, Sun, & Tang, 
2013). Therefore, the examination of market conditions affecting site selection has been critical to 
the business and industry sectors, and can offer substantial information about what promotes or 
hinders the evolution of markets. In order to demonstrate circumstances in which organization 
founders define market opportunities, several scholars have explored the difference in organizational 
behaviors among incumbents and late entrants by focusing on timing of market entry (Gallego, 
Hidalgo, Acedo, Casillas, & Moreno, 2009; Lilien & Yoon, 1990; Sinha & Noble, 2005). Exploiting 
the advantage that a judgment of where to locate is explicitly observable, previous studies have 
commonly emphasized that location strategies are closely tied to market densities obtained from the 
evaluation of competitors, as well as consumer features and needs (Bresnahan, Reiss, Willig, & 
Stigler, 1987; Gentry, Dalziel, & Jamison, 2013; Haveman, 1994; Kumar & Subramanian, 1997). 
Apart from the demand size represented by density of the population of school-aged children, the 
volume of service vendors with similar traits located in both physical and competitive distance may 
determine where educational service vendors initiate business, even when controlling for other 
potential market characteristics (Carroll & Hannan, 1989; Miller & Eden, 2006; Stretesky, Huss, & 
Lynch, 2012).  
Given the intermingling of market characteristics and densities in site decision, the research 
design of this study is inspired by the traditional model developed by Bresnahan and Reiss 
(Bresnahan et al., 1987; Bresnahan & Reiss, 1990; 1991), and at the same time guided by the studies 
conducted under Downes and his colleagues (Downes & Greenstein, 1996; Downes & Zabel, 2002). 
To explore market density as a determination of for-profit educational organizations’ location in 
quasi markets, this research works on three assumptions. First, all for-profit EMO charter schools 
have the same objective, maximizing profit. This study presumes that the solid business objective of 
profit-seeking directs a certain group of EMOs in competitive landscapes to common economic 
behaviors. Second, a for-profit EMO charter school competes with educational providers with 
similar features such as pre-existing private schools and other charter schools. Those selected 
competitors in this research have discretion over locating themselves for being privately operated. 
Their decision on site selection takes an influential role in shaping market density in traditional 
school markets where a district's capacity for serving children decides school locations, opening, 
consolidations and closures. Last, the catchment area of a particular for-profit charter school is not 
necessarily limited to the school district in which the charter school is geographically sited. As the 
past research on spatial characteristics of charter schools has insufficiently pictured market features 
that lead charter schools to engaging in a local educational market, the last two assumptions 
contribute to strengthening the significance of this study by paying attention to competitors within 
potential accessible areas. According to these assumptions, charter school i’s decision on location 
into school district j is assumed to be represented by the following equation: 
 
     Equation 1 
 
Ei
j = f (C j,X j,C- j,X- j,wi
j )
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where Cj is the number of competitors in school district j, C-j is the number of competitors in other 
school districts in the choice set, Xj is characteristics of school district j, X-j is characteristics of 
neighboring school districts in the choice set, and ωji is the error term.  
In Equation 1, the manner of defining an appropriate choice set plays a decisive role in 
explaining what features stimulate individual EMOs to get involved in a particular market, which is 
expected to allow the maximization of profits. Some studies establish potential choice sets within a 
given mile radius from homes (Bell, 2009; Burgess, Greaves, Vignoles, & Wilson, 2011; Cobb & 
Glass, 1999), and a number of scholars identify a charter school’s catchment area as the Census 
geographic units and school attendance boundaries to which the charter school belongs (Garcia, 
2008; Ritter, Jensen, Kisida, & Bowen, 2016; Saporito & Sohoni, 2006; 2007; Sohoni & Saporito, 
2009). Even though these technical approaches may be a simple and convenient method, they have 
impeded the progress of research on access to charter schools with non-residence requirements in 
competitive markets. Therefore, this study proposes two choice sets of potential school districts: 1) 
the first adjacent school districts of school district j and 2) all school districts within the same county 
where charter school i is located. This approach expanding accessible markets on the supply side can 
lessen impacts that individual local contexts respond for or against charter school openings in their 
communities on site selection. Considering that state governments have mainly legislated charter 
school rules and regulations, for-profit entities can equally survey the districts in one single state for 
relatively homogenous institutional backgrounds. The probability that charter school i chooses to 
enter at school district j among the set of potential school districts is found by a mixed effects 
logistic regression in R using the lme4 package.  
Data. The list of Michigan traditional public and charter schools during the 2010-11 school 
year was drawn from the Common Core Data by the National Center for Education Statistics, and 
then the charter schools were categorized into two groups, either for-profit or non-profit ones, 
based on the list of EMO charter schools which the National Education Policy Center publishes 
annually. As main competitors of for-profit EMO charter schools, non-public schools in Michigan 
were retrieved from the Michigan Department of Education. Using the Common Core Data, school 
district characteristics include graduation rates, dropout rates, logged expenditures per pupil, and the 
percentages of students who demonstrate proficiency in math, of students who are proficient in 
reading, of English language learners of students eligible for free or reduced lunch, of African-
American students, and of students with Hispanic or Latino origin. Based on the extensive research 
on segregation and stratification, community features at the census block group level take into 
account the percentages of African-American populations, of populations with Hispanic or Latino 
origin, of populations 25 years and over with a high school diploma, of populations 25 years and 
over who have experienced college education for more than one year, of populations aged 25 to 59 
who are unemployed, of families under the poverty level, of housing units occupied by owner, of 
housing units with no car, and vacancy rates. These community features were extracted from the 
2009-2011 American Community Survey 3-year estimates provided by the Census. 
Findings 
A profit-oriented organization’s location decision toward competitive markets can illuminate 
one shade of multifaceted organizational behaviors, by presenting the procedure to define 
prospective consumers and gather information about future markets. As this study operationally 
designs two potential choice sets from the supply side, Table 1 and 2 respectively demonstrate the 
results of the characteristics of school district, community and number of competitors by choice set. 
The first market includes only the closest neighboring school districts from the location of for-profit 
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EMO charter schools, and the second one expands its market size up to the same county where for-
profit EMO charter schools are located.  
Table 1 shows estimates of the parameters for the choice set of the school district where a 
for-profit EMO charter school is located and its closest surrounding school districts. In Model I of 
Table 1, only considering school district characteristics, for-profit EMO charter schools are more 
likely to position themselves in school districts that outperform in math, spend more money, have 
more students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch, and serve more minority students, in 
comparison with the neighboring school districts. However, for-profit EMO charter schools prefer 
school districts that have lower high school graduation rates and fewer students advanced in reading 
in comparison with the adjacent school districts. Model I of Table I specifically stresses that a school 
district’s spending increases three times in the odds ratio that a for-profit EMO charter school 
makes a site selection decision based on the school district, controlling for other characteristics at 
the school district level. In Model II of Table 1, all community features, except for the proportions 
of homeowners and housing units without cars, lead to increases in the odds ratios of positioning in 
a given school district, whereas there is no statistical significance in the unemployment rate and the 
share of populations with Hispanic or Latino origin. Looking at competitors in the choice set in 
Model III of Table 1, for-profit EMO charter schools tend to locate their business in competitive 
school districts where other profit-oriented EMO charter schools and private schools already exist.  
 
Table 1 
The estimates for the choice set of the first neighboring school districts 
 I II III IV V 
School district      
% of proficiency in math 0.245***   0.184*** 0.140*** 
% of proficiency in reading -0.150***   -0.071*** -0.071*** 
Graduation rate -0.002***   -0.008*** -0.020*** 
Dropout rate -0.014***   -0.031*** -0.037*** 
Logged expenditure per pupil 1.409***   1.281*** 2.082*** 
% of English language learners 0.002***   -0.029*** -0.043*** 
% of students eligible for free or reduced lunch 0.016***   0.049*** 0.038*** 
% of African-American students 0.013***   -0.075*** -0.103*** 
% of students with Hispanic or Latino origin 0.038***   -0.046*** -0.055*** 
Community      
% of African-American populations  0.005***  0.082*** 0.100*** 
% of populations with Hispanic or Latino origin  0.092***  0.141*** 0.177*** 
% of population 25 years and over with high school 
diploma 
 0.132***  0.163*** 0.182*** 
% of population 25 years and over with college 
education 
 0.124***  0.159*** 0.165*** 
% of families under the poverty level  0.129***  0.092*** 0.106*** 
% of populations aged 25 to 59 who are unemployed  -0.018***  0.033*** 0.043*** 
Vacancy rate  0.027***  -0.006*** -0.015*** 
% of housing units occupied by owner  -0.049***  -0.061*** -0.081*** 
% of housing units with no car  -0.104***  -0.078*** -0.128*** 
Competitor      
% of for-profit EMO charter schools   0.035***  0.055*** 
% of not-for-profit charter schools   0.020***  0.030*** 
% of private schools   0.026***  0.020*** 
Constant -25.379*** -11.319*** -3.106*** -36.367*** -38.164*** 
* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
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Although small changes of the estimates at the fifth and sixth columns of Table 1 are 
detected when holding competitors at a fixed value, Model V in Table I counts the substantial 
increase in the likelihood that a given school district’s expenditure encourages for-profit EMO 
charter schools to be engaged in the market in a similar fashion to Model I and IV. The last column 
of Table 1 shows that the combination of community characteristics and competitor information 
identifies the three descriptors of school districts, i.e. the proportion of proficiency in reading, the 
percent of Hispanic or Latino students and the graduate rate, as non-significant. Model V in Table 1 
also demonstrates that EMO charter schools with the purpose of profit maximization are more 
likely to be established in a school district with great proportions of African-American and Hispanic 
populations. The proportion of English language learners in a given school district, which is not 
statistically significant in Model 1 of Table 1, contributes to the considerably negative impact on a 
site selection of for-profit EMO charter schools. Taking into consideration market density leads to 
the increase in the coefficients for the statistically significant market factors in Model IV in Table 1, 
except the percent of proficiency in math and the percent of students eligible for free and reduced 
lunch.  
Overall, profit-seeking EMO charter schools tend to situate in communities with 
populations of color and educated adults. The significantly positive estimate of the presence of for-
profit EMO charter schools in a given school district, compared to its adjacent school districts, 
suggests that market research of educational businesses on location corresponds to common factors, 
rather than filling a market niche in the charter school landscape. In addition, the estimates in Table 
I do not emphasize structural differences in the variances by choice set solely embedding the first 
neighboring school districts. Such insignificant variances among the choice sets suggest that the local 
markets in which profit-motivated EMOs select for their business rest on mostly similar 
characteristics, irrespective of any disparities among the counties within the state. 
Given that enrollment in charter schools is not restricted by where students reside, their 
families are able to travel to further charter schools in the neighboring school district and even in a 
more remote one. In other words, for-profit EMOs may broaden an array of competitors and 
enlarge the pool of applicants for charter schools by expanding their future markets. A location 
decision by for-profit EMOs involves the process of differentiating all school districts in a particular 
county and opting for the most desirable one. Table 2 presents estimations of the choice set 
covering all school districts within the county where a for-profit EMO charter school is physically 
located. In comparison with Model I of Table 1 on the basis of the choice set of the closest school 
districts, Model I of Table 2 shows the similar but weak significances in the proportion of 
proficiency in math and the percent of students eligible for free or reduced lunch and from African-
American families. Rather, the estimations for the logged expenditure per pupil and the percent of 
African-American students in a school district increase with the expansion of potential markets from 
the provider perspective. At the community level in Model II of Table 2, the probability of for-
profit EMO charter schools’ decision to situate themselves in a given school district tends to be 
associated with only four factors: The proportions of African-American populations, populations 
with Hispanic or Latino origin, housing units occupied by owner, and housing units with no car. 
While a high density by profit-seeking EMO charter schools and private schools is statistically 
significant in the choice set of the first adjacent school districts as found in Model III of Table I, all 
the competitors in Model III of Table 2 partly contribute to attracting EMO charter schools 
pursuing financial gains.  
As presented in Model IV and V of Table 2, market share caused by entities with similar 
organizational objectives brings about the comprehensive increases in statistical significances and 
estimated coefficients. There exist significant changes by more than 10%, specifically in the odds 
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ratio in logged expenditures per pupil, the percentage of African-American populations, the 
proportion of populations with Hispanic or Latino origin, the proportion of populations who 
experience higher education for one year and over, and the percent of unemployed populations. 
Furthermore, the increases in dropout rates and low-income families seem to stall the establishment 
of profit-oriented EMO charter schools in particular school districts. For-profit EMO charter 
schools tend to tailor applicant pools by being located in school districts with more populations with 
vehicle ownership. Reflecting the notion that disadvantaged families were burdened with the cost of 
travelling to remote schools (Phillips, Hausman, & Larsen, 2012; Reay & Lucey, 2003), availability of 
personal vehicles could be positively related to increased likelihood of auto trips to school.  
All else being equal, school districts with a large number of for-profit EMO charter schools 
and a small number of non-profit EMO charter schools within the county boundaries are more 
likely to attract profit-oriented educational service providers. In view of market density that profit-
oriented EMO charter schools in Michigan select a school district consisting of varying market 
competitors, they are more likely to cluster around, not disperse across, certain school districts with 
a similar type of charter schools. Taken together, this study points out the behavior of the Michigan 
for-profit EMO charter schools, discouraging children with marginalized family backgrounds in 
impoverished communities from equally participating in markets. 
 
Table 2 
The estimates for the choice set of all school districts within the same county 
 I II III IV V 
School district      
% of proficiency in math 0.122***   0.125*** 0.069*** 
% of proficiency in reading -0.026***   -0.027*** -0.015*** 
Graduation rate 0.002***   -0.002*** -0.033*** 
Dropout rate -0.019***   -0.051*** -0.071*** 
Logged expenditure per pupil 2.507***   1.662*** 1.371*** 
% of English language learners 0.073***   0.014*** 0.022*** 
% of students eligible for free or reduced lunch 0.017***   0.073*** 0.050*** 
% of African-American students 0.037***   -0.064*** -0.095*** 
% of students with Hispanic or Latino origin 0.002***   -0.065*** -0.108*** 
Community      
% of African-American populations  0.034***  0.095*** 0.132*** 
% of populations with Hispanic or Latino origin  0.070***  0.119*** 0.197*** 
% of population 25 years and over with high school 
diploma 
 -0.032***  0.043*** 0.060*** 
% of population 25 years and over with college 
education 
 0.021***  0.088*** 0.098*** 
% of families under the poverty level  0.032***  0.000*** -0.017*** 
% of populations aged 25 to 59 who are unemployed  0.038***  0.060*** 0.107*** 
Vacancy rate  0.026***  0.004*** -0.005*** 
% of housing units occupied by owner  -0.044***  -0.042*** -0.067*** 
% of housing units with no car  -0.089***  -0.031*** -0.096*** 
Competitor      
% of for-profit EMO charter schools   0.072***  0.097*** 
% of not-for-profit charter schools   0.028***  -0.014*** 
% of private schools   0.027***  0.032*** 
Constant  -36.083*** -0.191*** -3.249*** -33.490*** -23.062*** 
* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
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Discussion 
The development of EMOs with a goal aligned with financial gains implicitly confirms that 
private firms’ belief that offering core educational services as a commodity is significant enough to 
produce monetary returns on investment. The rise of for-profit EMOs often becomes evidence of 
substantial shifts in the governance of education by suggesting a process for schooling to become 
privatized and commercialized (Bulkley, 2004; Tuckman, 1998). Thus, research on privatization in 
the public education sphere has contributed to understanding what market factors motivate, or 
hinder, EMOs to operate publicly funded charter schools and investigate the corresponding 
consequences. In a similar manner that other business models pursuing maximum profits value site 
selection in market analysis, EMOs are expected to examine school neighborhoods and prospective 
competitors within reachable areas. Based on the critical claim that uneven socio-geographies have 
constructed competitive market hierarchies (Bell, 2007; Gulosino & Lubienski, 2011; Holme, 2002; 
Lubienski & Dougherty, 2009), this study looks into the manner in which for-profit EMO charter 
schools in Michigan evaluate particular school districts by taking into consideration competitors 
within school markets.  
Overall, this study shows that profitable services are not designed to bring advantages to all 
students who reside in areas spanning an entire county, considering that many parents place much 
emphasis on proximity in choosing charter schools. The Michigan for-profit EMO charter schools 
are likely to open their business in school districts which outperform in math, have more at-risk 
students and spend more money for students, compared with adjacent school districts. Even when 
expanding the list of choice sets from the first neighboring school districts to all school districts 
within the same county, the differential impacts on the location decision are similarly found in those 
selected factors at both school district and community level. The research conclusion provides 
evidence consistent with previous results that charter schools in competitive markets protect their 
market position by opting for less costly and more easily educated students, and by excluding 
students from low-income or single-parent families.  
Along with the conventional facts, this study confirms earlier findings that charter schools 
are located in more competitive areas where private schools are already located (Girth, Hefetz, 
Johnston, & Warner, 2012; Glomm, Harris, & Lo, 2005; Miron, 2008). The findings highlight the 
significance of competitors specifically attributed to for-profit EMO charter schools and private 
schools in a similar manner of the close relation between market density and diversification in 
business and industrial markets (Gentry et al., 2013; Haveman, 1994). Though there are additional 
calls for further studies on the response of nonprofit EMO charter schools toward market density 
(Stretesky et al., 2012), the study overall suggests that the denser and more competitive local school 
markets appear to have more diverse profit-driven educational service providers. Moreover, special 
attention is called to the finding that for-profit EMO charter schools open their business in school 
districts with higher expenditures per pupil. Such relative importance of local spending on education 
primarily represents the way in which charter schools under for-profit business models chase money, 
in line with the latest finding that profit-oriented charter schools allocate a smaller portion of their 
expenses to instructional staff (Weber & Baker, in press). Apart from a high likelihood that students 
who reside in a wealthy school district have greater access to diverse school options, this study 
shows that the EMOs with the intent of generating satisfactory profit tend to maximize monetary 
resources through a large reliance on government funding earned by location selection, not through 
benefit from parent choice upon innovation and diversification in instruction-related activities 
(Lubienski, 2009; Lubienski & Lee, 2016; Renzulli, Barr, & Paino, 2015; Teresa & Good, in press; 
U.S. Department of Education, 2016). In other words, the uneven distribution of educational service 
Education Policy Analysis Archives  Vol.  26 No. 77 14 
 
providers partly demonstrates that competitiveness and marketability obtained through site selection 
has become instrumental in reinforcing geographical barriers to school access.  
In view of underlying variations among local markets, shopping for schools becomes more 
or less favorable to children in a particular region (Lichter et al., 2012; Nechyba, 2010; Putnam, 
2000). Here, the rising concern is that the site selection decision by profit-oriented EMOs 
diminishes democratic values and objectives, which are required for public entities. The widespread 
belief that schooling is a public good has placed for-profit vendors managing of charter schools in 
the category of public entities, so that educational service vendors operating charter schools have 
presented specific understanding of bureaucratic procedures by complying with administrative rules 
and regulations. However, the current processes of privatization in education and commodification 
of schooling fundamentally challenge the two conditions of non-excludability and non-rivalrousness 
essential to define a public good (Labaree, 1997; Lubienski, 2006). The empowerment of the 
demand side in educational markets results in competition for limited seats at quality schools, and 
the Michigan for-profit EMOs’ heavy dependence on profitability financed by local education 
agencies excludes a certain population in a given area. Under this circumstance, their distinctive 
behavior of devoting to self-interest of the supply side may be the byproduct of increasing difficulty 
in positioning the inherent attribute of profit-seeking organizations in appropriate alignment with 
public values in public schooling. Given that the lack of the comprehension of public values in 
competitive markets exposes privately owned and run EMO charter schools to struggles between 
private interests and public purposes (Hansmann, 1980; Labaree, 1997; Lubienski, 2006; Samuelson, 
1954), we should carefully question and consider how private firms pursuing monetary gains make a 
contribution to democratic accountability for equal access (Biesta, 2004; DiMartino & Scott, 2013; 
Epstein, 1993; Garn, 2001; Garn & Cobb, 2001; Shipps & White, 2009). In rethinking the purpose 
of parental choice and competition among educational providers in terms of equitable environments 
as well as efficient structures for public education, discourse about whether to confine schooling 
provided by profit-oriented firms to a public or private commodity is necessary to establish their 
role and limitations. 
References 
Amirkhanyan, A. A., Kim, H. J., & Lambright, K. T. (2008). Does the public sector outperform the 
nonprofit and for-profit sectors? Evidence from a national panel study on nursing home quality 
and access. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 27, 326–353. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/pam.20327 
Andrews, R., & Entwistle, T. (2010). Does cross-sectoral partnership deliver? An empirical 
exploration of public service effectiveness, efficiency, and equity. Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory, 20, 679–701. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mup045 
Andrews, R., & Van de Walle, S. (2013). New public management and citizens' perceptions of local 
service efficiency, responsiveness, equity and effectiveness. Public Management Review, 15, 762–
783. https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2012.725757 
Bader, M. D. M., & Krysan, M. (2015). Community attraction and avoidance in Chicago: What's race 
got to do with it? Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 660, 261–281. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716215577615 
Bartik, T. J. (1985). Business location decisions in the United States: Estimates of the effects of 
unionization, taxes, and other characteristics of states. Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 
3(1), 14–22. 
Bell, C. A. (2007). Space and place: Urban parents’ geographical preferences for schools. Urban 
Understanding site selection of for -profit EMO charter schools 15 
 
Review, 39, 375–404. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11256-007-0059-5 
Bell, C. A. (2009). Geography in parental choice. American Journal of Education, 115, 493–521. 
https://doi.org/10.1086/599779 
Besley, T., & Ghatak, M. (2003). Incentives, choice and accountability in the provision of public 
services. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 19, 235–249. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/19.2.235 
Betts, J. R. (2005). The economic theory of school choice. In J. R. Betts & T. Loveless (Eds.), Getting 
choice right: Ensuring equity and efficiency in education policy (pp. 14–39). New York, NY: Brookings 
Institution Press. 
Biesta, G. J. (2004). Education, accountability, and the ethical demand: Can the democratic potential 
of accountability be regained? Educational Theory, 54, 233–250. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0013-
2004.2004.00017.x 
Boyne, G. A. (2002). Public and private management: What's the difference. Journal of Management 
Studies, 39, 97–122. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6486.00284 
Boyne, G. A., Powell, M., & Ashworth, R. (2001). Spatial equity and public services: An empirical 
analysis of local government finance in England. Public Management Review, 3, 19–34. 
Bozeman, B. (1987). All organizations are public. London, United Kingdom: Jossey-Bass. 
Bozeman, B. (2007). Public values and public interest: Counterbalancing economic individualism. 
Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 
Brekke, K. R., Siciliani, L., & Straume, O. R. (2011). Hospital competition and quality with regulated 
prices. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 113, 444–469. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
9442.2011.01647.x 
Bresnahan, T. F., & Reiss, P. C. (1990). Entry in monopoly market. The Review of Economic Studies, 57, 
531–553. https://doi.org/10.2307/2298085 
Bresnahan, T. F., & Reiss, P. C. (1991). Entry and competition in concentrated markets. The Journal 
of Political Economy, 99, 977–1009. https://doi.org/10.1086/261786 
Bresnahan, T. F., Reiss, P. C., Willig, R., & Stigler, G. J. (1987). Do entry conditions vary across 
markets? Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1987, 833–881. https://doi.org/10.2307/2534455 
Briffault, R. (1996). The local government boundary problem in metropolitan areas. Stanford Law 
Review, 48, 1115–1171. https://doi.org/10.2307/1229382 
Brown, H., Henig, J. R., Lacireno-Paquet, N., & Holyoke, T. T. (2004). Scale of operations and locus 
of control in market- versus mission-oriented charter schools. Social Science Quarterly, 85, 1035–
1051. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0038-4941.2004.00259.x 
Brown, T. L., Potoski, M., & Van Slyke, D. M. (2006). Managing public service contracts: Aligning 
values, institutions, and markets. Public Administration Review, 66, 323–331. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2006.00590.x 
Bulkley, K. E. (2004). Balancing act: Educational management organizations and charter school 
autonomy. In K. E. Bulkley & P. Wohlstetter (Eds.), Taking account of charter schools What“s 
happened and what”s next (pp. 121–141). New York, NY: Teachers College Press. 
Bulkley, K. E. (2005). Losing voice?: Educational management organizations and charter schools' 
educational programs. Education and Urban Society, 37, 204–234. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0013124504271984 
Burgess, S., Greaves, E., Vignoles, A., & Wilson, D. (2011). Parental choice of primary school in 
England: What types of school do different types of family really have available to them? Policy 
Studies, 32, 531–547. https://doi.org/10.1080/01442872.2011.601215 
Burgess, S., Greaves, E., Vignoles, A., & Wilson, D. (2015). What parents want: School preferences 
and school choice. The Economic Journal, 125, 1262–1289. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12153 
Byrnes, V. (2009). Getting a feel for the market: The use of privatized school management in 
Education Policy Analysis Archives  Vol.  26 No. 77 16 
 
Philadelphia. American Journal of Education, 115, 437–455. https://doi.org/10.1086/597486 
Cameron, W. (2004). Public accountability: Effectiveness, equity, ethics. Australian Journal of Public 
Administration, 63(4), 59–67. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8500.2004.00402.x 
Carroll, G. R., & Hannan, M. T. (1989). Density dependence in the evolution of populations of 
newspaper organizations. American Sociological Review, 54(4), 524–541. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2095875 
Caves, R. E., & Porter, M. E. (1977). From entry barriers to mobility barriers: Conjectural decisions 
and contrived deterrence to new competition. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 91, 241–262. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/1885416 
Chubb, J. E., & Moe, T. M. (1990). Politics, markets, and America's schools. Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution. 
Clark, W. A. V. (1992). Residential preferences and residential choices in a multiethnic context. 
Demography, 29, 451–466. https://doi.org/10.2307/2061828 
Cleveland, G., & Krashinsky, M. (2009). The nonprofit advantage: Producing quality in thick and 
thin child care markets. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 28, 440–462. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/pam.20440 
Cobb, C. D., & Glass, G. V. (1999). Ethnic segregation in Arizona charter schools. Education Policy 
Analysis Archives, 7(1). https://doi.org/10.14507/epaa.v7n1.1999 
Conn, K. (2002). For-profit school management corporations: Serving the wrong master. Journal of 
Law and Education, 31, 129–148. 
DiMaggio, P. J., & Anheier, H. K. (1990). The sociology of nonprofit organizations and sectors. 
Annual Review of Sociology, 16, 137–159. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.so.16.080190.001033 
DiMartino, C. C., & Scott, J. T. (2013). Private sector contracting and democratic accountability. 
Educational Policy, 27, 307–333. https://doi.org/10.1177/0895904812465117 
Downes, T. A., & Greenstein, S. M. (1996). Understanding the supply decisions of nonprofits: 
Modelling the location of private schools. The RAND Journal of Economics, 27, 365–390. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2555932 
Downes, T. A., & Greenstein, S. M. (2002). Entry into the schooling market: How is the behaviour 
of private suppliers influenced by public sector decisions? Bulletin of Economic Research, 54, 341–
371. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8586.00156 
Downes, T. A., & Zabel, J. E. (2002). The impact of school characteristics on house prices: Chicago 
1987–1991. Journal of Urban Economics, 52, 1–25. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0094-1190(02)00010-
4 
Educational Policy Institute. (2005). Focus on results: An academic impact analysis of the Knowledge Is Power 
Program (KIPP). Virginia Beach, VA: Educational Policy Institute. 
Emerson, M. O., Chai, K. J., & Yancey, G. (2001). Does race matter in residential segregation? 
Exploring the preferences of white Americans. American Sociological Review, 66, 922–935. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/3088879 
Engel, M. (2000). The struggle for control of public education: Market ideology vs. democratic 
values. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. 
Epstein, D. (1993). Defining accountability in education. British Educational Research Journal, 19, 243–
257. https://doi.org/10.1080/0141192930190303 
Ertas, N., & Roch, C. H. (2014). Charter schools, equity, and student enrollments: The role of for-
profit Educational Management Organizations. Education and Urban Society, 46, 548–579. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0013124512458118 
Estes, M. B. (2004). Choice for all?: Charter schools and students with special needs. The Journal of 
Special Education, 37, 257–267. https://doi.org/10.1177/00224669040370040501 
Understanding site selection of for -profit EMO charter schools 17 
 
Ferris, J. M., & Graddy, E. A. (1999). Structural changes in the hospital industry, charity care, and 
the nonprofit role in health care. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 28, 18–31. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0899764099281002 
Field, K. S., & Briggs, D. J. (2001). Socio‐economic and locational determinants of accessibility and 
utilization of primary health‐care. Health & Social Care in the Community, 9, 294–308. 
https://doi.org/10.1046/j.0966-0410.2001.00303.x 
Freeman, J. (2003). Extending public law norms through privatization. Harvard Law Review, 116, 
1285–1352. https://doi.org/10.2307/1342728 
Fuentelsaz, L., & Gómez, J. (2006). Multipoint competition, strategic similarity and entry into 
geographic markets. Strategic Management Journal, 27, 477–499. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.529 
Fuller, B., Gawlik, M. A., Gonzales, E. K., Park, S., & Gibbings, G. (2003). Charter schools and 
inequality: National disparities in funding, teacher quality, and student support. Berkeley, CA: Policy 
Analysis for California Education. 
Gallego, M. A., Hidalgo, E. R., Acedo, F. J., Casillas, J. C., & Moreno, A. M. (2009). The relationship 
between timing of entry into a foreign market, entry mode decision and market selection. Time 
& Society, 18, 306–331. https://doi.org/10.1177/0961463X09337843 
Garcia, D. R. (2008). The impact of school choice on racial segregation in charter schools. 
Educational Policy, 22, 805–829. https://doi.org/10.1177/0895904807310043 
Garcia, D. R., Molnar, A., & Barber, R. (2009). Profiting from public education: Education 
management organizations and student achievement. Teachers College Record, 111, 1352–1379. 
Garn, G. (2001). Moving from bureaucratic to market accountability: The problem of imperfect 
information. Educational Administration Quarterly, 37, 571–599. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/00131610121969424 
Garn, G., & Cobb, C. D. (2001). A framework for understanding charter school accountability. 
Education and Urban Society, 33, 113–128. https://doi.org/10.1177/0013124501332002 
Garrity, B. K. F., Garrison, M. J., & Fiedler, R. C. (2010). Access for whom, access to what? The 
role of the “disadvantaged student” market in the rise of for-profit higher education in the 
United States. Journal for Critical Education Policy Studies, 8(1), 202–244. 
Gentry, R. J., Dalziel, T., & Jamison, M. A. (2013). Who do start-up firms imitate? A study of new 
market entries in the CLEC industry. Journal of Small Business Management, 51(4), 525–538. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/jsbm.12055 
Gill, B., Zimmer, R. W., Christman, J., & Blanc, S. (2007). State takeover, school restructuring, private 
management, and student achievement in Philadelphia. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. 
https://doi.org/10.7249/MG533 
Girth, A. M., Hefetz, A., Johnston, J. M., & Warner, M. E. (2012). Outsourcing public service 
delivery: Management responses in noncompetitive markets. Public Administration Review, 72, 
887–900. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2012.02596.x 
Glazerman, S. M. (1998). School quality and social stratification: The determinants and 
consequences of parental school choice. Presented at the annual meeting of the American 
Educational Research Association, San Diego, CA. 
Glomm, G., Harris, D. N., & Lo, T.-F. (2005). Charter school location. Economics of Education Review, 
24, 451–457. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econedurev.2004.04.011 
Goldring, E. B., & Hausman, C. S. (1999). Reasons for parental choice of urban schools. Journal of 
Education Policy, 14, 469–490. https://doi.org/10.1080/026809399286161 
Gran, B., & Henry, W. (2007). Holding private prisons accountable: A socio-legal analysis of 
“contracting out” prisons. Social Justice, 34, 173–194. 
Gulosino, C., & d'Entremont, C. (2011). Circles of influence: An analysis of charter school location 
Education Policy Analysis Archives  Vol.  26 No. 77 18 
 
and racial patterns at varying geographic scales. Education Policy Analysis Archives, 19(8). 
https://doi.org/10.14507/epaa.v19n8.2011 
Gulosino, C., & Lubienski, C. A. (2011). Schools’ strategic responses to competition in segregated 
urban areas: Patterns in school locations in metropolitan Detroit. Education Policy Analysis 
Archives, 19(13). https://doi.org/10.14507/epaa.v19n13.2011 
Gulosino, C., & Miron, G. (2017). Evaluating the locational attributes of education management 
organizations (EMOs). Journal of School Choice, 11, 357–398. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/15582159.2017.1302265 
Hansmann, H. B. (1980). The role of nonprofit enterprise. The Yale Law Journal, 89, 835–901. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/796089 
Hanushek, E. A., Kain, J. F., & Rivkin, S. G. (2004). Disruption versus Tiebout improvement: The 
costs and benefits of switching schools. Journal of Public Economics, 88, 1721–1746. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(03)00063-X 
Haque, M. S. (2001). The Diminishing Publicness of Public Service under the Current Mode of 
Governance. Public Administration Review, 61, 65–82. https://doi.org/10.1111/0033-3352.00006 
Hastings, J. S., Kane, T. J., & Staiger, D. O. (2005). Parental preferences and school competition: Evidence 
from a public school choice program (No. 11805). Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic 
Research. https://doi.org/10.3386/w11805 
Haveman, H. A. (1994). The ecological dynamics of organizational change: Density and mass 
dependence in rates of entry into new markets. In J. A. C. Baum & J. V. Singh (Eds.), 
Evolutionary dynamics of organizations (pp. 152–166). New York, NY. 
Heen, M. L. (2004). Congress, public values, and the financing of private choice. Ohio State Law 
Journal, 65, 853–912. 
Henig, J. R., Holyoke, T. T., Brown, H., & Lacireno-Paquet, N. (2005). The influence of founder 
type on charter school structures and operations. American Journal of Education, 111, 487–588. 
https://doi.org/10.1086/431181 
Henig, J. R., & MacDonald, J. A. (2002). Locational decisions of charter schools: Probing the market 
metaphor. Social Science Quarterly, 83, 962–980. https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6237.00126 
Highsmith, A. R., & Erickson, A. T. (2015). Segregation as splitting, segregation as joining: Schools, 
housing, and the many modes of Jim Crow. American Journal of Education, 121, 563–595. 
https://doi.org/10.1086/681942 
Holme, J. J. (2002). Buying homes, buying schools: School choice and the social construction of 
school quality. Harvard Educational Review, 72, 177–206. 
https://doi.org/10.17763/haer.72.2.u6272x676823788r 
Hotelling, H. (1929). Stability in competition. The Economic Journal, 39(153), 41–57. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2224214 
Jargowsky, P. A. (1997). Poverty and place: Ghettos, barrios, and the American city. Russell Sage 
Foundation Publications. 
Jargowsky, P. A. (2014). Segregation, neighborhoods, and schools. In A. Lareau & K. A. Goyette 
(Eds.), Choosing homes, choosing schools (pp. 97–136). New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Kain, J. F. (1992). The spatial mismatch hypothesis: Three decades later. Housing Policy Debate, 3, 
371–460. https://doi.org/10.1080/10511482.1992.9521100 
Keddie, A. (2016). School autonomy as “the way of the future”: Issues of equity, public purpose and 
moral leadership. Educational Management Administration & Leadership, 44, 713–727. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1741143214559231 
Krysan, M., Couper, M. P., Farley, R., & Forman, T. A. (2009). Does race matter in neighborhood 
preferences? Results from a video experiment. American Journal of Sociology, 115, 527–559. 
Understanding site selection of for -profit EMO charter schools 19 
 
https://doi.org/10.1086/599248 
Kumar, V., & Subramanian, V. (1997). A contingency framework for the mode of entry decision. 
Journal of World Business, 32(1), 53–72. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1090-9516(97)90025-0 
Labaree, D. F. (1997). Public goods, private goods: The American struggle over educational goals. 
American Educational Research Journal, 34(1), 39–81. https://doi.org/10.3102/00028312034001039 
Lacireno-Paquet, N. (2004). Do EMO-operated charter schools serve disadvantaged students? The 
influence of state policies. Education Policy Analysis Archives, 12(26). 
https://doi.org/10.14507/epaa.v12n26.2004 
Lacireno-Paquet, N., Holyoke, T. T., Moser, M., & Henig, J. R. (2002). Creaming versus cropping: 
Charter school enrollment practices in response to market incentives. Educational Evaluation and 
Policy Analysis, 24, 145–158. https://doi.org/10.3102/01623737024002145 
Le Grand, J. (2007). The other invisible hand : Delivering public services through choice and 
competition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Levett, R. (2003). A better choice of choice: Quality of life, consumption and economic growth. 
London, United Kingdom: Fabian Society. 
Lichter, D. T., Parisi, D., & Taquino, M. C. (2012). The geography of exclusion: race, segregation, 
and concentrated poverty. Social Problems, 59, 364–388. 
https://doi.org/10.1525/sp.2012.59.3.364 
Lilien, G. L., & Yoon, E. (1990). The timing of competitive market entry: An exploratory study of 
new industrial products. Management Science, 36, 568–585. 
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.36.5.568 
Lubienski, C. A. (2006). School choice and privatization in education: An alternative analytical 
framework. Journal for Critical Education Policy Studies, 4(1). Retrieved from 
http://www.jceps.com/print.php?articleID=57 
Lubienski, C. A. (2009). Do quasi-markets foster innovation in education? (No. EDU/WKP(2009)4). Paris, 
OECD: Organization for Economic Co-operation Development. 
https://doi.org/10.1787/221583463325 
Lubienski, C. A., & Dougherty, J. (2009). Mapping educational opportunity: Spatial analysis and 
school choices. American Journal of Education, 115, 485–491. https://doi.org/10.1086/599783 
Lubienski, C. A., Gulosino, C., & Weitzel, P. C. (2009). School choice and competitive incentives: 
Mapping the distribution of educational opportunities across local education markets. American 
Journal of Education, 115, 601–647. https://doi.org/10.1086/599778 
Lubienski, C. A., & Lee, J. (2016). Competitive incentives and the education market: How charter 
schools define themselves in metropolitan Detroit. Peabody Journal of Education, 91, 64–80. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/0161956X.2016.1119582 
Lubienski, C. A., Lee, J., & Gordon, L. (2013). Self-managing schools and access for disadvantaged 
students: Organizational behaviours and school admissions. New Zealand Journal of Educational 
Studies, 48(1), 82–98. 
Mac Iver, M. A., & Mac Iver, D. J. (2006). Which bets paid off? Early findings on the impact of 
private management and K‐8 conversion reforms on the achievement of Philadelphia students. 
Review of Policy Research, 23, 1077–1093. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-1338.2006.00250.x 
Marshall, J. D., Wilson, R. D., Meyer, K. L., Rajangam, S. K., McDonald, N. C., & Wilson, E. J. 
(2010). Vehicle emissions during children’s school commuting: Impacts of education policy. 
Environmental Science & Technology, 44, 1537–1543. https://doi.org/10.1021/es902932n 
Marwell, N. P., & McInerney, P.-B. (2005). The nonprofit/for-profit continuum: Theorizing the 
dynamics of mixed-form markets. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 34, 7–28. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0899764004269739 
Education Policy Analysis Archives  Vol.  26 No. 77 20 
 
Massey, D. S., & Denton, N. A. (1993). American apartheid: Segregation and the making of the 
underclass. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Miller, S. R., & Eden, L. (2006). Local density and foreign subsidiary performance. Academy of 
Management Journal, 49(2), 341–355. https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2006.20786081 
Minow, M. (2005). Outsourcing power: How privatizing military effort challenges accountability, 
professionalism, and democracy. Boston College Law Review, 46, 989–1026. 
Miron, G. (2008). Education management organizations. In H. F. Ladd & E. B. Fiske (Eds.), 
Handbook of research in education finance and policy (pp. 475–494). New York, NY: Routledge. 
Miron, G., & Gulosino, C. (2013). Profiles of for-profit and nonprofit education management organizations: 
Fourteenth edition, 2011-2012. Boulder, CO: National Education Policy Center. 
Miron, G., Evergreen, S., & Urschel, J. L. (2008). The impact of school choice reforms on student achievement. 
Education and the Public Interest Center & Education Policy Research Unit (Vol. 31). Boulder, CO & 
Tempe, AZ: Education and the Public Interest Center & Education Policy Research Unit. 
Miron, G., Urschel, J. L., Mathis, W. J., & Tornquist, E. (2010). Schools without diversity: Education 
management organizations, charter schools, and the demographic stratification of the American school system. 
Education and the Public Interest Center & Education Policy Research Unit. Boulder, CO & Tempe, AZ: 
Education and the Public Interest Center & Education Policy Research Unit. 
Miron, G., Urschel, J. L., Yat Aguilar, M. A., & Dailey, B. (2012). Profiles of for-profit and nonprofit 
education management organizations: Thirteenth annual report, 2010-2011. Boulder, CO: National 
Education Policy Center. 
Molnar, A., Wilson, G., Restori, M., & Hutchison, J. (2002). Profiles of for-profit education management 
companies: Fourth annual report 2001-2002. Tempe, AZ: Commercialism in Education Research 
Unit at Arizona State University. 
Morley, J. (2006). For-profit and nonprofit charter schools: An agency costs approach. The Yale Law 
Journal, 115, 1782–1821. https://doi.org/10.2307/20455669 
National Alliance for Public Charter Schools. (2012). A growing movement: America’s largest charter school 
communities. Washington, DC: National Alliance for Public Charter Schools. 
Nechyba, T. J. (2010). Tiebout sorting and competition. In P. Peterson, E. Baker, & B. McGaw 
(Eds.), International encyclopedia of education (pp. 338–393). Cambridge, MA: Elsevier. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-044894-7.01259-8 
Neutens, T. (2015). Accessibility, equity and health care: Review and research directions for 
transport geographers. Journal of Transport Geography, 43, 14–27. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtrangeo.2014.12.006 
Phillips, K. J. R., Hausman, C. S., & Larsen, E. S. (2012). Students who choose & the schools they 
leave: Examining participation in intra-district transfers. The Sociological Quarterly, 53, 264–294. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1533-8525.2012.01234.x 
Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community. New York, 
NY: Simon & Schuster. https://doi.org/10.1145/358916.361990 
Rainey, H. G. (1979). Perceptions of incentives in business and government: Implications for civil 
service reform. Public Administration Review, 39, 440–448. https://doi.org/10.2307/3109918 
Ravitch, D. (2013). Reign of error: The hoax of the privatization movement and the danger to 
America's public schools. New York, NY: Alfred a Knopf Incorporated. 
Reay, D., & Lucey, H. (2003). The limits of “choice”: Children and inner city schooling. Sociology, 37, 
121–142. https://doi.org/10.1177/0038038503037001389 
Reitz, S. W. (2008). Mastering two services: Advancing public values through school privatization. 
Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy, 6, 101–127. 
Renzulli, L. A., Barr, A. B., & Paino, M. (2015). Innovative education? A test of specialist mimicry or 
Understanding site selection of for -profit EMO charter schools 21 
 
generalist assimilation in trends in charter school specialization over time. Sociology of Education, 
88, 83–102. https://doi.org/10.1177/0038040714561866 
Renzulli, L. A., & Evans, L. (2005). School choice, charter schools, and white flight. Social Problems, 
52, 398–418. https://doi.org/10.1525/sp.2005.52.3.398 
Rhodes, A., & DeLuca, S. (2014). Residential mobility and school choice among poor families. In A. 
Lareau & K. A. Goyette (Eds.), Choosing homes, choosing schools (pp. 137–166). New York, NY: 
Russell Sage Foundation. 
Ritter, G. W., Jensen, N. C., Kisida, B., & Bowen, D. H. (2016). Urban school choice and 
integration: The effect of charter schools in Little Rock. Education and Urban Society, 48, 535–555. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0013124514546219 
Robertson, W. B. (2015). Mapping the profit motive: A comparative analysis of for-profit and non-
profit charter schools. Education Policy Analysis Archives, 23(69). 
https://doi.org/10.14507/epaa.v23.1864 
Robinson, M. (2007). Does decentralisation improve equity and efficiency in public service delivery 
provision? IDS Bulletin, 38(1), 7–17. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1759-5436.2007.tb00333.x 
Roghmann, K. J., & Zastowny, T. R. (1979). Proximity as a factor in the selection of health care 
providers: Emergency room visits compared to obstetric admissions and abortions. Social Science 
& Medicine, 13D, 61–69. https://doi.org/10.1016/0160-8002(79)90028-5 
Samuelson, P. A. (1954). The pure theory of public expenditure. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 
36, 387–389. https://doi.org/10.2307/1925895 
Saporito, S., & Sohoni, D. (2006). Coloring outside the lines: Racial segregation in public schools 
and their attendance boundaries. Sociology of Education, 79, 81–105. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/003804070607900201 
Saporito, S., & Sohoni, D. (2007). Mapping educational inequality: Concentrations of poverty among 
poor and minority students in public schools. Social Forces, 85, 1227–1253. 
https://doi.org/10.1353/sof.2007.0055 
Savas, E. S. (2005). Privatization in the city: Successes, failures, lessons. Washington, DC: CQ Press. 
Scott, J. T., & DiMartino, C. C. (2010). Hybridized, franchised, duplicated, and replicated: Charter 
schools and management organizations. In C. A. Lubienski & P. C. Weitzel (Eds.), The charter 
school experiment: Expectations, evidence and implications (pp. 171–196). Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
Education Press. 
Shipps, D., & White, M. (2009). A new politics of the principalship? Accountability-driven change in 
New York City. Peabody Journal of Education, 84, 350–373. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01619560902973563 
Sinclair, M. (2003). Three futures for university provision: The social justice market, state capitalism 
and private for-profit universities. Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management, 25, 161–171. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1360080032000122633 
Sinha, R. K., & Noble, C. H. (2005). A model of market entry in an emerging technology market. 
IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, 52, 186–198. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/TEM.2005.844467 
Sohoni, D., & Saporito, S. (2009). Mapping school segregation: Using GIS to explore racial 
segregation between schools and their corresponding attendance areas. American Journal of 
Education, 115, 569–600. https://doi.org/10.1086/599782 
Starr, P. (2014). The meaning of privatization. In S. B. Kamerman & A. J. Khan (Eds.), Privatization 
and the welfare state (pp. 15–48). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Stretesky, P. B., Huss, S., & Lynch, M. J. (2012). Density dependence and environmental justice 
organizations, 1970–2008. The Social Science Journal, 49(3), 343–351. 
Education Policy Analysis Archives  Vol.  26 No. 77 22 
 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.soscij.2012.03.002 
Teresa, B. F., & Good, R. M. (in press). Speculative charter school growth in the case of UNO 
Charter School Network in Chicago. Urban Affairs Review. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/1078087417703487 
Theobald, R. (2005). School choice in Colorado Springs: The relationship between parental 
decisions, location and neighbourhood characteristics. International Research in Geographical & 
Environmental Education, 14, 92–111. https://doi.org/10.1080/10382040508668340 
Tiebout, C. M. (1956). A pure theory of local expenditures. The Journal of Political Economy, 64, 416–
424. https://doi.org/10.1086/257839 
Tilak, J. B. G. (2008). Higher education: A public good or a commodity for trade? Prospects, 38, 449–
466. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11125-009-9093-2 
Tuckman, H. P. (1998). Competition, commercializotion, and the evolution of nonprofit 
organizational structures. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 17, 175–194. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1520-6688(199821)17:2<175::AID-PAM4>3.0.CO;2-E 
U.S. Department of Education. (2016, December 21). New Analysis Finds Many For-Profits Skirt 
Federal Funding Limits. Retrieved January 6, 2017, from https://www.ed.gov/news/press-
releases/new-analysis-finds-many-profits-skirt-federal-funding-limits 
U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2003). Public schools: Comparison of achievement results for 
students attending privately managed and traditional schools in six cities (No. GAO-04-62). Washington, 
DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office. 
U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2012). Charter schools: Additional federal attention needed to help 
protect access for student with disabilities (No. GAO-12-543). Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Accountability Office. 
Van Slyke, D. M. (2003). The mythology of privatization in contracting for social services. Public 
Administration Review, 63, 296–315. https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6210.00291 
Warner, M. E., & Hefetz, A. (2002). Applying market solutions to public services: An assessment of 
efficiency, equity, and voice. Urban Affairs Review, 38, 70–89. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/107808702401097808 
Warner, M. E., & Hefetz, A. (2008). Managing markets for public service: The role of mixed public-
private delivery of city services. Public Administration Review, 68, 155–166. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2007.00845.x 
Weber, M., & Baker, B. D. (in press). Do for-profit managers spend less on schools and instruction? 
A national analysis of charter school staffing expenditures. Educational Policy. 
Weisbrod, B. A. (1988). The nonprofit economy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Wettenhall, R. (2003). The rhetoric and reality of public-private partnerships. Public Organization 
Review, 3, 77–107. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1023000128175 
Wilson, W. J. (2012). The truly disadvantaged: The inner city, the underclass, and the public policy. 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226924656.001.0001 
Zhang, X.-K., Sun, W., & Tang, G.-Y. (2013). Market density and entry decision: An empirical study 
in emerging economy (pp. 625–631). Presented at the 20th International Conference on 
Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-
40063-6_62 
Zollers, N. J., & Ramanathan, A. K. (1998). For-profit charter schools and students with disabilities: 
The sordid side of the business of schooling. The Phi Delta Kappan, 80, 297–304. 
Understanding site selection of for -profit EMO charter schools 23 
 
About the Author 
Jin Lee  
University of Louisiana at Lafayette 
jinlee@lousiana.edu   
Jin Lee is an assistant professor in the Department of Educational Foundations and Leadership 
at the University of Louisiana at Lafayette. Her research focuses on school choice programs and 
urban school reforms. Her current work examines neighborhood effects on equity and access, 
including racial disproportionality in school discipline and local market responses to competitive 
environments. She has published journal articles in Journal of Education Policy, Education and Urban 
Society, and Geographical Research. 
 
education policy analysis archives 
Volume 26 Number 77        July 2, 2018 ISSN 1068-2341 
 
 Readers are free to copy, display, and distribute this article, as long as the work is 
attributed to the author(s) and Education Policy Analysis Archives, it is distributed for non-
commercial purposes only, and no alteration or transformation is made in the work. More 
details of this Creative Commons license are available at 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/. All other uses must be approved by the 
author(s) or EPAA. EPAA is published by the Mary Lou Fulton Institute and Graduate School 
of Education at Arizona State University Articles are indexed in CIRC (Clasificación Integrada de 
Revistas Científicas, Spain), DIALNET (Spain), Directory of Open Access Journals, EBSCO 
Education Research Complete, ERIC, Education Full Text (H.W. Wilson), QUALIS A1 (Brazil), 
SCImago Journal Rank; SCOPUS, SOCOLAR (China). 
Please send errata notes to Audrey Amrein-Beardsley at audrey.beardsley@asu.edu   
 
Join EPAA’s Facebook community at https://www.facebook.com/EPAAAAPE and Twitter 
feed @epaa_aape. 
 
Education Policy Analysis Archives  Vol.  26 No. 77 24 
 
education policy analysis archives 
editorial board  
Lead Editor: Audrey Amrein-Beardsley (Arizona State University) 
Editor Consultor: Gustavo E. Fischman (Arizona State University) 
Associate Editors: David Carlson, Lauren Harris, Eugene Judson, Mirka Koro-Ljungberg, Scott Marley, Molly 
Ott, Iveta Silova (Arizona State University) 
Cristina Alfaro San Diego State 
University 
Amy Garrett Dikkers University 
of North Carolina, Wilmington 
Susan L. Robertson 
Bristol University 
Gary Anderson New York  
University  
Gene V Glass  Arizona 
State University 
Gloria M. Rodriguez 
University of California, Davis 
Michael W. Apple University of 
Wisconsin, Madison  
Ronald Glass  University of 
California, Santa Cruz 
R. Anthony Rolle University of  
Houston 
Jeff Bale OISE, University of 
Toronto, Canada 
Jacob P. K. Gross  University of 
Louisville 
A. G. Rud Washington State 
University  
Aaron Bevanot SUNY Albany Eric M. Haas WestEd Patricia Sánchez University of 
University of Texas, San Antonio 
David C. Berliner  Arizona 
State University  
Julian Vasquez Heilig California 
State University, Sacramento 
Janelle Scott  University of 
California, Berkeley  
Henry Braun Boston College  Kimberly Kappler Hewitt University 
of North Carolina Greensboro 
Jack Schneider College of the Holy 
Cross 
Casey Cobb  University of 
Connecticut  
Aimee Howley  Ohio University Noah Sobe  Loyola University 
Arnold Danzig  San Jose State 
University  
Steve Klees  University of Maryland 
Jaekyung Lee SUNY Buffalo  
Nelly P. Stromquist  University of 
Maryland 
Linda Darling-Hammond  
Stanford University  
Jessica Nina Lester 
Indiana University 
Benjamin Superfine University of  
Illinois, Chicago 
Elizabeth H. DeBray University of 
Georgia 
Amanda E. Lewis  University of 
Illinois, Chicago      
Adai Tefera Virginia  
Commonwealth University 
Chad d'Entremont  Rennie Center 
for Education Research & Policy 
Chad R. Lochmiller Indiana 
University 
Tina Trujillo    University of  
California, Berkeley 
John Diamond University of 
Wisconsin, Madison 
Christopher Lubienski  Indiana 
University  
Federico R. Waitoller University of 
Illinois, Chicago 
Matthew Di Carlo Albert Shanker 
Institute 
Sarah Lubienski  Indiana University Larisa Warhol  
University of Connecticut 
Sherman Dorn 
Arizona State University 
William J. Mathis University of 
Colorado, Boulder 
John Weathers University of  
Colorado, Colorado Springs 
Michael J. Dumas University of 
California, Berkeley 
Michele S. Moses University of 
Colorado, Boulder 
Kevin Welner University of  
Colorado, Boulder 
Kathy Escamilla  University of 
Colorado, Boulder 
Julianne Moss  Deakin  
University, Australia  
Terrence G. Wiley  Center  
for Applied Linguistics 
Yariv Feniger Ben-Gurion 
University of the Negev 
Sharon Nichols  University of Texas, 
San Antonio  
John Willinsky   
Stanford University  
Melissa Lynn Freeman Adams 
State College 
Eric Parsons University of  
Missouri-Columbia 
Jennifer R. Wolgemuth University of 
South Florida 
Rachael Gabriel 
University of Connecticut 
Amanda U. Potterton 
University of Kentucky 
Kyo Yamashiro Claremont Graduate 
University 
 
Understanding site selection of for -profit EMO charter schools 25 
 
archivos analíticos de políticas educativas 
consejo editorial 
Editor Consultor: Gustavo E. Fischman (Arizona State University) 
Editores Asociados: Armando Alcántara Santuario (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México), Jason Beech, 
(Universidad de San Andrés), Angelica Buendia, (Metropolitan Autonomous University), Ezequiel Gomez Caride, 
(Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina), Antonio Luzon, (Universidad de Granada), José Luis Ramírez, 
Universidad de Sonora), Paula Razquin (Universidad de San Andrés) 
 
Claudio Almonacid 
Universidad Metropolitana de 
Ciencias de la Educación, Chile 
Ana María García de Fanelli  
Centro de Estudios de Estado y 
Sociedad (CEDES) CONICET, 
Argentina 
Miriam Rodríguez Vargas 
Universidad Autónoma de 
Tamaulipas, México 
Miguel Ángel Arias Ortega 
Universidad Autónoma de la 
Ciudad de México 
Juan Carlos González Faraco 
Universidad de Huelva, España 
José Gregorio Rodríguez 
Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 
Colombia 
Xavier Besalú Costa  
Universitat de Girona, España 
María Clemente Linuesa 
Universidad de Salamanca, España 
Mario Rueda Beltrán Instituto de 
Investigaciones sobre la Universidad 
y la Educación, UNAM, México 
Xavier Bonal Sarro Universidad 
Autónoma de Barcelona, España   
 
Jaume Martínez Bonafé 
 Universitat de València, España 
José Luis San Fabián Maroto  
Universidad de Oviedo,  
España 
 
Antonio Bolívar Boitia 
Universidad de Granada, España 
Alejandro Márquez Jiménez 
Instituto de Investigaciones sobre la 
Universidad y la Educación, 
UNAM, México 
Jurjo Torres Santomé, Universidad 
de la Coruña, España 
José Joaquín Brunner Universidad 
Diego Portales, Chile  
María Guadalupe Olivier Tellez, 
Universidad Pedagógica Nacional, 
México 
Yengny Marisol Silva Laya 
Universidad Iberoamericana, 
México 
Damián Canales Sánchez 
Instituto Nacional para la 
Evaluación de la Educación, 
México  
 
Miguel Pereyra Universidad de 
Granada, España 
Ernesto Treviño Ronzón 
Universidad Veracruzana, México 
Gabriela de la Cruz Flores 
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de 
México 
Mónica Pini Universidad Nacional 
de San Martín, Argentina 
Ernesto Treviño Villarreal 
Universidad Diego Portales 
Santiago, Chile 
Marco Antonio Delgado Fuentes 
Universidad Iberoamericana, 
México 
Omar Orlando Pulido Chaves 
Instituto para la Investigación 
Educativa y el Desarrollo 
Pedagógico (IDEP) 
Antoni Verger Planells 
Universidad Autónoma de 
Barcelona, España 
Inés Dussel, DIE-CINVESTAV, 
México 
 
José Ignacio Rivas Flores 
Universidad de Málaga, España 
Catalina Wainerman  
Universidad de San Andrés, 
Argentina 
Pedro Flores Crespo Universidad 
Iberoamericana, México 
 Juan Carlos Yáñez Velazco 
Universidad de Colima, México 
 
   
    
Education Policy Analysis Archives  Vol.  26 No. 77 26 
 
 
 arquivos analíticos de políticas educativas 
conselho editorial 
Editor Consultor:  Gustavo E. Fischman (Arizona State University) 
Editoras Associadas: Kaizo Iwakami Beltrao, (Brazilian School of Public and Private Management - EBAPE/FGV, 
Brazil), Geovana Mendonça Lunardi Mendes (Universidade do Estado de Santa Catarina), Gilberto José Miranda, 
(Universidade Federal de Uberlândia, Brazil), Marcia Pletsch, Sandra Regina Sales (Universidade Federal Rural do 
Rio de Janeiro) 
 
Almerindo Afonso 
Universidade do Minho  
Portugal 
 
Alexandre Fernandez Vaz  
Universidade Federal de Santa 
Catarina, Brasil 
José Augusto Pacheco 
Universidade do Minho, Portugal 
Rosanna Maria Barros Sá  
Universidade do Algarve 
Portugal 
 
Regina Célia Linhares Hostins 
Universidade do Vale do Itajaí, 
 Brasil 
Jane Paiva 
Universidade do Estado do Rio de 
Janeiro, Brasil 
Maria Helena Bonilla  
Universidade Federal da Bahia  
Brasil 
 
Alfredo Macedo Gomes  
Universidade Federal de Pernambuco 
Brasil 
Paulo Alberto Santos Vieira  
Universidade do Estado de Mato 
Grosso, Brasil 
Rosa Maria Bueno Fischer  
Universidade Federal do Rio Grande 
do Sul, Brasil 
 
Jefferson Mainardes  
Universidade Estadual de Ponta 
Grossa, Brasil 
Fabiany de Cássia Tavares Silva 
Universidade Federal do Mato 
Grosso do Sul, Brasil 
Alice Casimiro Lopes  
Universidade do Estado do Rio de 
Janeiro, Brasil 
Jader Janer Moreira Lopes  
Universidade Federal Fluminense e 
Universidade Federal de Juiz de Fora, 
Brasil 
António Teodoro  
Universidade Lusófona 
Portugal 
Suzana Feldens Schwertner 
Centro Universitário Univates  
Brasil 
 
 Debora Nunes 
 Universidade Federal do Rio Grande 
do Norte, Brasil 
Lílian do Valle 
Universidade do Estado do Rio de 
Janeiro, Brasil 
Flávia Miller Naethe Motta 
Universidade Federal Rural do Rio de 
Janeiro, Brasil 
 
Alda Junqueira Marin 
 Pontifícia Universidade Católica de 
São Paulo, Brasil 
Alfredo Veiga-Neto 
 Universidade Federal do Rio Grande 
do Sul, Brasil 
 Dalila Andrade Oliveira 
Universidade Federal de Minas 
Gerais, Brasil 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
